Abstract. This paper presents the first constructions for certificateless encryption (CLE) schemes that are provably secure against strong adversaries in the standard model. It includes both a generic construction for a strongly secure CLE scheme from any passively secure scheme as well as a concrete construction based on the Waters identity-based encryption scheme.
Introduction
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), as proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] , represents an interesting and potentially useful balance between identity-based cryptography and public key cryptography based on certificates. It eliminates the key escrow associated with identity-based cryptography without requiring the introduction of certificates, which pose many operational difficulties in PKIs. The main idea of CL-PKC is that a user Alice combines two key components to form her private key: one component (the partial private key, PPK) is generated by a Key Generation Centre (KGC) using a master secret, and another component (the secret value) is generated by the user herself. The user also publishes a public key derived from her secret value; a party who wishes to encrypt to Alice only needs to have Alice's identity and public key along with the KGC's public parameters. One novel aspect of CL-PKC is the modelling of adversaries who are capable of replacing the public keys of users with keys of their choice. This is necessary because there are no certificates to authenticate users' public keys in CL-PKC.
The topic of certificateless cryptography has undergone quite rapid development, with many schemes being proposed for encryption (CLE) [1, 3, 6, 12, 25] and signatures (CLS) [1, 20, 22, 33, 36] . One notable feature has been the development of a number of alternative security models for CLE that are substantially weaker than the original model of [1] . These different models are summarised by Dent [14] . In the model of [1] , the attacker is of one of two types. The Type I attacker models an "outsider" adversary, who can replace the public keys of users, obtain PPKs and private keys, and make decryption queries. The Type II attacker models an "honest-but-curious" KGC who is given the master secret (and can therefore generate any PPK), can obtain private keys and make decryption queries, but is trusted not to replace any public keys. (We actually use a slightly stronger model of security for Type II attackers, in which the attacker can replace public keys providing that they do not allow the attacker to trivially break the scheme.)
In their original security model, Al-Riyami and Paterson chose to make the Type I adversary as strong as possible, insisting in their model that a challenger should correctly respond to decryption queries even if the public key of a user had been replaced. This is called a Strong Type I attacker in [14] . Currently, the only published CLE schemes that have been proven secure against strong Type I adversaries [1, 25] make use of the random oracle model [4] . Notably, Libert and Quisquater [25] provide a generic construction which converts a CLE scheme secure against passive adversaries (who do not have access to a decryption oracle) into a scheme secure against strong adversaries, using a Fujisaki-Okamoto-style conversion [17] . This conversion allows decryption queries to be handled using a form of knowledge extraction, but does require the use of random oracles.
Related Work
In 2003, Gentry [19] introduced a different but related concept named certificate based encryption (CBE). This approach is closer to the context of a traditional PKI model as it involves a certification authority (CA) providing an efficient implicit certification service for clients' public keys.
Subsequent works [34, 32] considered the relations between identity-based (IBE), certificate based (CBE) and certificateless encryption schemes (CLE) and established a result of essential equivalence [34] between the three primitives. The generic transformations of [34, 32] do not use random oracles but those results do not hold in the full security model developed in [1] for CLE schemes; indeed, they were even shown not to hold in relaxed CLE models [18] .
In [15] , Dodis and Katz described generic methods to construct IND-CCA secure multiple-encryption schemes from public key encryption schemes which are individually IND-CCA. They proved that their methods apply to the design of certificate-based encryption schemes [19] and yield CBE schemes without random oracles. Because of the strong properties required of decryption oracles in [1] , these techniques do not directly apply in the present context. In security proofs, the technical difficulty is that the simulator does not know the secret value of entities whose public key was replaced. In other words, the constructions of [15] are not designed to handle decryption queries for arbitrary public keys chosen "on-the-fly" by adversaries who may not even know the matching secret as in the present context.
Other authors [26] have also recently attempted to address the problem of designing certificateless cryptosystems (or related primitives) in the standard model. However their results are not presented in the full model of [1] . In particular, the recent work of Huang and Wong [21] constructs a certificateless encryption scheme that is secure in the standard model but does not permit a Strong Type I adversary.
Finally, a recently initiated research direction considers authorities that maliciously generate system-wide parameters [2] . As we shall see, the model of [2] makes it even more difficult to devise schemes that are provably secure in the standard model. Neither of the schemes we present are secure against adversaries that maliciously generate the system-wide parameters.
Our Contributions
We make two contributions which resolve questions raised by the above debate concerning CLE security models.
Firstly, we present a generic construction for strongly secure CLE. Our construction uses any CLE scheme and any normal public key encryption (PKE) scheme as components, but these only need to be secure against passive adversaries. In contrast to [25] , our construction does not intrinsically require the use of random oracles. Instead, we use an extension of the techniques of NaorYung [27] and Sahai [29] ; however, some additional ideas are needed to handle decryption queries for adversarially-selected public keys. As it makes use of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs for general statements in NP, our generic construction cannot be regarded as being practical.
Secondly, we provide the first concrete and efficient construction for a CLE scheme that is secure in the standard model against strong adversaries. In fact, our scheme is secure against both Strong Type I attackers and Strong Type II adversaries. The latter represents a natural strengthening of the original Type II adversary introduced in [1] . The construction is based upon the Waters identitybased encryption (IBE) scheme, modifying this scheme using ideas from [1] . The scheme enjoys relatively short public keys and ciphertexts; its security is based on the hardness of a slight and natural generalisation of the DBDH problem.
Why Consider Strong Decryption Oracles?
There has been some debate on whether the Strong Type I and Strong Type II security models correctly model the security capabilities of an attacker against a certificateless encryption scheme [1, 6, 12, 21] . A full discussion of this issue is given in the survey by Dent [14] . It can be argued that an attacker should be given access to an oracle if it supplies information that an attacker might be able to obtain in real life. For example, a decryption oracle provides information about a message that an attacker might be able to obtain by observing how a system behaves after receiving and decrypting a ciphertext or by bribing/threatening the user who received a ciphertext. In certificateless encryption, it is necessary to model the adversary's ability to fool a sender into using the wrong public key when encrypting a message, because public keys are not supported by certificates. This is done by allowing the adversary to replace public keys at will in the model. But there is no reason to suppose that a recipient would use anything other than its own, original private key when decrypting. So there is no practical reason to require that a decryption oracle for a replaced public key should be available to the attacker.
However, we still believe that the results of this paper are of theoretical interest to the research community, even if they are not practically relevant. There are several reasons for this:
-The strong models have been widely used in the previous papers and the question of whether it is possible to construct a scheme that is secure in the Strong Type I and Strong Type II models without using the random oracle methodology has been widely discussed. Indeed, it has even been conjectured that it was impossible to construct schemes that are both Strong Type I and Strong Type II secure in the standard model. In this paper, we show this conjecture to be false. -Even if the strong model is not of practical interest, security in this model does guarantee security in the weaker, but more practically relevant, security models. Hence, at a basic level, this paper can be seen to be proving the security of several certificateless encryption schemes in the standard model (assuming honest-but-curious KGCs). Of particular interest is the generic construction presented in Section 3, which demonstrates that certificateless encryption schemes can be constructed from generic assumptions. -Lastly, our work demonstrates that it is possible for a polynomial-time scheme to be secure in a model that allows the attacker access to oracles that compute non-polynomial-time functions (in this case computing the decryptions of ciphertexts created using arbitrary public keys). We believe that the idea of considering the security of schemes in non-polynomial-time models to be theoretically interesting.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use the following notation. Let ∅ denote the empty bitstring. If A is a deterministic algorithm, then y ← A(x) denotes the assignment to y of the output of A when run on the input x. If A is a randomised algorithm, then y $ ← A(x) the assignment to y of the output of A when run on the input x with a fresh random tape. We let y ← A(x; r) denote the assignment to y of the output of A when run on the input x with the random tape r. If A is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm, then we may assume that r is of polynomial length. If S is a finite set, then y $ ← S denotes the random generation of an element x ∈ S using the uniform distribution. A function ν :
Certificateless Encryption Schemes
The notion of a certificateless encryption scheme was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] . A certificateless public-key encryption scheme is defined by seven probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms:
-Setup: takes as input a security parameter 1 k and returns the master private key msk and the master public key mpk . This algorithm is run by a KGC to initially set up a certificateless system. -Extract: takes as input the master public key mpk , the master private key msk , and an identifier ID ∈ {0, 1} * . It outputs a partial private key d ID . This algorithm is run by a KGC once for each user, and the corresponding partial private key is distributed to that user in a suitably secure manner.
-SetSec: given the master public key mpk and an entity's identifier ID as input, and outputs a secret value x ID for that identity. This algorithm is run once by the user. -SetPriv: takes as input the master public key mpk , an entity's partial private key d ID and an entity's secret value x ID . It outputs the full private key sk ID for that user. This algorithm is run once by the user. -SetPub: given the master public key mpk and an entity's secret value x ID , this algorithm outputs a public key pk ID ∈ PK for that user. This algorithm is run once by the user and the resulting public key is widely and freely distributed. The public-key space PK is defined using mpk and is assumed to be publicly recognisable: given mpk , public keys having a matching private key should be easily distinguishable from ill-formed public keys. -Encrypt: this algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk , a user's identity ID, a user's public key pk ID ∈ PK and a message m ∈ M. It outputs either a ciphertext C ∈ C or the error symbol ⊥. -Decrypt: this algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk , a user's private key sk ID and a ciphertext C ∈ C. It returns either a message m ∈ M or the error symbol ⊥.
We insist that all certificateless encryption schemes satisfy the obvious correctness conditions (that decryption "undoes" encryption). Dent [14] has surveyed the numerous different security models proposed for certificateless encryption. In this paper, we will only be concerned with the Strong Type I and Strong Type II security definitions. Both of these security models consider attack games that extend the standard IND-CCA attack game for public-key encryption. In both games, we are concerned with the difference in probability
for X ∈ {I, II} where A is any PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and the experiment Expt
We insist that A 1 outputs messages (m 0 , m 1 ) such that |m 0 | = |m 1 |. The Type I security model (X = I) and the Type II security model (X = II) are distinguished by the value aux and the oracles to which the attacker has access. The Type I model is meant to represent an outside attacker and so aux = ∅. The Type II model captures the actions of an honest-but-curious KGC and so aux = msk . We consider the following oracles:
-Request public key: the attacker supplies an identity ID and the oracle returns the public key pk ID for that identity. If pk ID has not previously been defined, the oracle generates it. -Replace public key: the attacker supplies an identity ID and a public key pk ID ∈ PK, and the oracle replaces any previously generated public key for ID with pk ID . Such a query is only allowed for correctly shaped new keys. Recall that the model of [1] requires the well-formedness of pk ID (and the existence of a secret value) to be publicly checkable. We note that the definition of Type II security only covers honest-but-curious KGCs, as originally defined by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] . An alternative definition, proposed by Au et al. [2] , attempts to model security against a KGC that can maliciously generate its master public and private keys. We note that our schemes are not secure in this model. Nevertheless, we claim that the original security model still captures a significant level of security and that the design of secure standard model schemes fitting the original definitions represents a significant step forward in the theory of certificateless encryption. We do not find it unrealistic to assume that KGCs are honest at key generation time and erase relevant crucial information in case they are later broken into. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a scheme can be proven secure against malicious key generation centres and outside attackers in the standard model and with strong decryption oracles using known proof techniques. The recent work of Huang and Wong [21] proves the security of a scheme against malicious KGCs in the standard model but does not permit a Strong Type I adversary, so the construction of such a scheme should still be considered an open problem.
A certificateless encryption scheme is said to be strongly secure if it is both Strong Type I and Strong Type II secure. A certificateless encryption scheme is said to be passively secure if it is Strong Type I and Strong Type II secure against adversaries who make no decryption oracle queries.
Generic Construction
In this section we develop a generic construction of a strongly secure certificateless encryption scheme from a passively secure certificateless encryption scheme, a passively secure public key encryption scheme, and a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof system. We do this by adapting the ideas of Naor-Yung [27] and Sahai [29] to the certificateless setting. The requirement that the simulator be able to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted using arbitrary public keys makes the construction slightly more complicated than in the public-key encryption case.
We first recall the notion of an NP language and that of simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Our requirements are similar to those of Sahai [29] , but slightly more demanding.
there exists a (deterministic) Turing machine R that is polynomial-time with respect to its first input and satisfies:
We require a NIZK proof system that is statistically sound, computationally simulation-sound and computationally zero-knowledge. We require statistical soundness because (at one point in the proof) we will be forced to simulate a decryption oracle that can provide functionality that cannot be computed in polynomial-time, i.e. decrypting ciphertexts that are encrypted under adversarially chosen public keys.
Definition 4. A statistically sound, computationally simulation-sound, and computationally zero knowledge non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK) for a language
where f is a polynomial and P , V , S 1 and S 2 are probabilistic, polynomial-time Turing machines that satisfy the following conditions:
For all x ∈ L and all w such that R(x, w) = 1, and for all strings
* and all strings (σ, κ) 
is negligible as a function of the security parameter k where the probability is taken over the choice of σ
we have that Adv
Output 1 if and only if:
is negligible as a function of k, where
uses a (single theorem) computationally sound and computationally zero-knowledge NIZK proof system to construct a (multiple theorem) computationally sound, computationally simulation-sound and computationally zero-knowledge NIZK proof system. This construction assumes that one-way permutations exist. A brief examination of the proof verifies that we can construct a statistically sound, computationally simulation-sound NIZK proof system from a statistically sound NIZK proof system. Furthermore, it is not difficult to verify that statistically sound NIZK proof systems can be constructed for any NP language using the techniques of Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [16] under the assumption that certified trapdoor permutations exist. This condition is relaxed by Bellare and Yung [5] to require only that trapdoor permutations exist. Therefore we can construct suitably secure NIZK proof systems under the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist. Our construction will also make use of a passivelysecure encryption scheme.
Definition 5. A triple of PPT algorithms (G, E, D) is an encryption scheme if (1) G takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a public key pk and a private key sk; (2) E takes as input a message m ∈ M and a public key pk, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C; and (3) D takes as input a ciphertext C ∈ C and a private key sk, and outputs either a message m ∈ M or the error symbol ⊥. This encryption scheme is said to be passively secure if the difference in probabilities
Adv PKE-CPA A (k) = |P r[Expt PKE-CPA A (0, k) = 1] − P r[Expt PKE-CPA A (1, k) = 1]|
is negligible for every probabilistic, polynomial-time attacker
where we insist that |m 0 | = |m 1 |.
We construct a strongly secure CLE scheme from a passively secure one and two distinct instances of a public-key encryption scheme. We use the NIZK proof system to prove that these independently generated ciphertexts all encrypt the same message. Let (Setup, Extract, SetSec, SetPriv, SetPub, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a passively secure CLE scheme and (G, E, D) be a passively secure public-key encryption scheme. Furthermore, let (f, P, V, S 1 , S 2 ) be a statistically sound and computationally simulation-sound NIZK proof system for the language
Let (Setup , Extract, SetSec, SetPriv, SetPub, Encrypt , Decrypt ) be the certificateless encryption scheme derived from the passively secure scheme and the algorithms given in Figure 1 . We assume that users' public key pk and identity ID are included in their full private key sk. We also assume (for simplicity and without loss of generality) that the random tapes used by each of the algorithms is of length poly(k). 
then the certificateless encryption scheme given in Figure 1 is secure in the Strong Type I and Strong Type II models.
The proof is given in Appendix A. It depends upon the fact that the master private key msk does not contain the decryption keys for the public-key encryption schemes (msk 2 , msk 3 ) or the simulation key κ for the NIZK proof system. We stress that this proof only works against Strong Type II adversaries who follow the setup procedure precisely, including the secure deletion of (msk 2 , msk 3 ) and κ. The scheme can be trivially broken by a KGC that can generate the master public key in an adversarial way. In the standard model, it remains an open problem to construct a scheme that is strongly secure against adversaries who can generate the master public key.
Remark 1. This construction can also be thought of as using a NIZK proof to bind the encryption of a message under a passively secure certificateless encryption scheme to the encryption of the same message under an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme. In the specific case of the construction that we have proposed, the IND-CCA2 encryption scheme is the Sahai [29] construction of an IND-CCA2 encryption scheme from two passively secure encryption schemes and a (separate) NIZK proof system. The proofs of security can easily be adapted to the case where an arbitrary IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme is used.
Remark 2. We note that we may construct passively secure encryption schemes and suitably secure NIZK proof systems for any NP language from trapdoor one-way permutations [29] . Furthermore, we may construct passively secure CLE schemes from passively secure public-key encryption schemes and passively secure identity-based encryption schemes [25] . Hence, we can conclude that strongly secure certificateless encryption schemes exist provided that NIZK proof systems and passively secure identity-based encryption schemes exist.
It is an open problem to show that a passively secure identity-based encryption scheme can be constructed from any recognised minimal assumption. Since it is possible to construct NIZK proof systems [10] and passively secure identitybased encryption schemes [31] under the DBDH assumption, we can conclude that there exists a strongly secure certificateless encryption schemes under the DBDH assumption alone.
Remark 3. Two public-key encryption scheme are required in order to provide security against attackers with access to a strong decryption oracle. In weaker security models, where the attacker does not have access to a strong decryption oracle, a single public-key encryption scheme suffices.
Concrete Construction
Our concrete construction for CLE uses bilinear map groups, i.e. groups (G, G T ) of prime order p for which there is an efficiently computable mapping e : G×G → G T with the following properties:
In such groups, we require the intractability of the following decisional problem that was suggested for the first time in [7] as a natural variant of the DBDH and DDH problems.
we define the advantage of a PPT algorithm A as
Our scheme is easily adapted to work in the more general setting of prime-order groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) with a pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T (instantiable from ordinary elliptic curve unlike the symmetric configuration that requires supersingular curves), in which case we need to use the obvious variant of the above hardness assumption. We also require a hash function H drawn from a family of collision resistant hash functions.
is negligible as a function of the security parameter.
Our scheme is an extension of the chosen-ciphertext secure IBE obtained by applying ideas from Boyen, Mei and Waters [9] to the 2-level hierarchical extension of the Waters IBE. 
. We note that these vectors define the hash functions
where ID = i 1 i 2 . . . i n and w = w 1 w 2 . . . w n . We also select a collisionresistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . The master public key is
and the master secret
SetSec(mpk): Return a randomly chosen secret value
with t = rx ID + r . C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and the private key sk ID as (s 1 , s 2 ). Check that
where w ← H(C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ID, pk ID ), and reject C if those conditions do not hold. Otherwise, return
To check the completeness, we note that private keys (s 1 , s 2 ) satisfy
and so
To speed up the decryption algorithm using ideas from [23] , we observe that the receiver can randomly choose α
which is the actual plaintext if C was properly encrypted and a random element of G T otherwise. The well-formedness of C is thus implicitly checked and a product of three pairings suffices to decipher the message. This is sufficient to satisfy our security models; however, it should be noted that this system has the disadvantage of outputting a random message when presented with an invalid ciphertext. This may be a problem in some applications. In the same way, the public key validation can be made implicit at encryption: given pk ID = (X, Y ), the sender picks β
which actually encrypts m whenever pk ID has the correct shape and results in an invalid ciphertext otherwise.
We have the following security results for this concrete scheme: 
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B; it uses ideas from [9, 31] . Namely, the mapping F v is chosen so as to have
Kv(w) , for certain functions J v and K v , in the simulation of the attack environment. Hence, for any valid ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) , we have C 1 = g s and C 3 = F v (w) s , for some s ∈ Z * p , and the simulator can extract
whenever J v (w) = 0 mod p. Hence, the simulator can compute e (Y, g 2 ) s regardless of whether the public key pk = (X, Y ) was replaced or not. 
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B and uses similar ideas to the proof of Theorem 2.
The reductions given in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 leave definite room for improvement since chosen-ciphertext security is achieved by applying the Boyen-Mei-Waters techniques [9] to a 2-level HIBE.
One solution to improve the reduction is to use the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [11] or Boneh-Katz [8] techniques that significantly lengthen ciphertexts and/or introduce additional assumptions for the security of the scheme. If we borrow ideas from [35] and generate the checksum value C 3 = F (w) s using a chameleon hash function [24] in instead of Waters' "hash", an interesting tradeoff can be achieved. In the above variant, a single element of Z * p (acting as random coins used to compute of the chameleon hash function) should be appended to ciphertexts and the degradation factor q d is avoided in both reductions. Using a chameleon hash function built upon Pedersen's discrete-logarithm-based trapdoor commitment [28], the resulting combination does not imply any additional intractability assumption for the security of the final scheme. 
A Proof of Theorem 1
We will use standard game hopping techniques. The proof is simple, but it requires a large number of game hops. In the language of Shoup [30], almost every transition will be a "transition based on indistinguishability". We seek to bound the advantage of an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time attacker attacker A
for X ∈ {I, II}. The proof strategy is the same for both Type I and Type II security. First, we re-write Expt
where
Hence, Expt
The proof strategy is given in Figure 2 . It is clear that if we can show that the difference between the success probabilities in successive games is negligible, then we will have shown that the difference in probabilities between the first and last game is negligible, and can therefore conclude that the proposed certificateless encryption scheme is secure.
Game Description Transition Game 1 This game is identical to Expt
We change the way in which the decryption oracle works. To decrypt a ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , π), instead of searching for the unique message which encrypts to the given ciphertext (a nonpolynomial-time operation), we simply decrypt the ciphertext C 3 using msk 3.
Statistically sound Game 3
We simulate the NIZK proof in the challenge ciphertext rather than generating a proper NIZK proof. This will allow us later to produce false proofs.
Zero knowledge
Game 4 We change the value of α from 0 to 1.
Type X security Game 5 We change the value of β from 0 to 1. Security of the encryption scheme Game 6 It would be nice if, at this stage, we could change γ from 0 to 1. However, if we were to try to do this, we would run into a problem as we would not be able to simulate the decryption oracle. Hence, we change the way the decryption oracle works. A ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , π) is now decrypted by decrypting the ciphertext C 2 using the msk 2.
Simulation-sound
Game 7 We change the value of γ from 0 to 1.
Security of the encryption scheme
Game 8
We produce the NIZK proof in the challenge ciphertext using the correct algorithm. Zero knowledge
Game 9
We change the way the decryption oracle works back to the correct method, i.e. the oracle searches for the unique value m gives the ciphertext when encrypted. This games is now identical to Expt Remark. The construction of secure public key encryption schemes presented by Sahai [29] only requires the combination of two passively secure components with a NIZK. It may be wondered why our construction requires three passively secure components (two public-key encryption schemes and a certificateless encryption scheme). The use of two public-key encryption schemes in our CLE construction allows us to simulate the strong decryption oracles. If we were to use a single public-key encryption scheme, then we would be unable to simulate the strong decryption oracle when we make the game hop based on the security of that encryption scheme. This is because we cannot decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts using the private key of the certificateless encryption scheme. It should be noted that if we only require security in a model without strong decryption oracles, then a single public-key encryption scheme suffices. 
-and let Π = (Setup , Extract, SetSec, SetPriv, SetPub, Encrypt , Decrypt ) be the certificateless encryption scheme defined by Π and the algorithm contained in Figure 1 . 
is any probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary in Strong Type I security model, then
Proof The proof uses standard game hopping techniques.
Game 1 and Game 2 -Simulating the decryption oracle (part 1)
Let Game 1 be identical to Expt CL-CCA-X A (0, k). Let Game 2 be identical to Game 1 except that we change the way in which the decryption oracle handles decryption queries. In Game 2, the decryption oracle uses the following algorithm to decrypt ciphertexts:
which is negligible as a function of k by the assumption that Σ is a statistically sound NIZK proof system. We will need to use the following basic lemma: We may now state and prove the lemma which captures the difficulty associated with this game hop.
Lemma 2.
|Pr[A outputs 1|A plays
Proof Game 1 and Game 2 proceed identically unless A submits a decryption query (
. Let E be the event that this occurs, and let A and B be the events that A outputs 1 in Game 1 and Game 2 respectively. Note if E occurs, then x / ∈ L; hence, Pr[E] ≤ Adv NIZK-Sim . The result can now be proven by applying Lemma 1.
Game 3 -Simulating the challenge ciphertext (part 1)
We next replace the proof π * used in the challenge ciphertext with a simulated proof. Let Game 3 be identical to Game 2 except that the proof π * in the challenge encryption is produced using the simulated proof algorithms, rather than the real proof algorithm. In other words, we define Game 3 to be: Proof Consider the following probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against the zero knowledge property of the NIZK proof system Σ:
It is easy to see that B can handle all of A's oracle queries trivially (using its knowledge of msk ) except for the decryption oracle queries. This it handles by first checking whether V (x, π, σ) = 1 and (if so) responding with D (C 3 , msk 3 ) . Therefore, it is easy to see that Hence, the lemma holds by the definition of computational zero knowledge.
Game 4 -The passive Type X security of the certificateless scheme Let Game 4 be identical to Game 3 except that, when we construct the challenge ciphertext, the Encrypt algorithm is applied to m 1 rather than m 0 . In other words,
(k) for all probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries B which make no decryption oracle queries. This value will be negligible of the certificateless scheme in question is passively secure.
where B is an algorithm that runs in approximately the same time as A.
Proof Consider the following probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against the passive security of the certificateless encryption scheme Π:
Note that B may answer all of A's oracle queries using its own oracles, except for A's decryption oracle queries. B may answer A's decryption oracle queries directly using msk 3 . Therefore, it is easy to see that 
Hence, the lemma holds by the definition of a passively secure certificateless encryption scheme.
Game 5 -The passive security of the encryption scheme (part 1)
Let Game 5 be identical to Game 4 except that, when we construct the challenge ciphertext, the first instance of the public key encryption algorithm E is applied to m 1 rather than m 0 . In other words, Game 5(k):
Proof Consider the following probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against the passive security of the public-key encryption scheme Γ :
Note that B can answer all of A's oracle queries using its knowledge of msk 1 and msk 3 . Therefore, it is easy to see that 
Hence, the lemma holds by the definition of a passively secure public-key encryption scheme.
Game 6 -Simulating the decryption algorithm (part 2) It would be nice if, at this stage, we could use the same argument as in Game 5 to move to a game in which m 1 was encrypted by the second instance of the public-key encryption scheme. Unfortunately, we cannot do this at the moment. The reason for this is that, in the adversarial algorithm B which we used to relate Game 4 and Game 5, we used our knowledge of msk 3 in order to simulate the decryption algorithm. Therefore, if we were to try and change the second instance of public-key encryption scheme to encrypt m 1 , then we would not know msk 3 and therefore would not be able to simulate the decryption algorithm. In order to solve this problem, we change the decryption algorithm so that it decrypts ciphertexts using msk 2 rather than msk 3 .
Let Game 6 be identical to Game 5 except that the decryption algorithm used by the decryption oracle is changed to Decrypt (C, sk, mpk ):
Proof We apply Lemma 1 for this result. Let A and B be the events that A outputs 1 in Game 5 and Game 6 respectively. Let E be the event that A submits a ciphertext ( We now construct an adversary against the simulation-soundness of the NZIK proof system whose advantage is related to Pr [E] . Consider the probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) where B 1 (1 k , σ) acts as follows:
For all oracle queries except decryption oracle queries, B responds to A correctly using its knowledge of msk . If A queries the decryption oracle with a ciphertext It is clear to see that if E occurs, then B will output a false proof and so break the simulation-soundness of the NIZK proof system. In other words, This game hop is similar to the hop between Game 4 and Game 5. Let Game 7 be identical to Game 6 except that when we construct the challenge ciphertext, the second instance of the public key encryption algorithm E is applied to m 1 rather than m 0 . In other words, Game 7(k):
This lemma is proven in exactly the same way as Lemma 5.
Game 8 -Simulating the challenge ciphertext (part 2)
We now start to restore the certain elements in the game. We begin by removing the simulated proof. Let Game 8 be identical to Game 7 except that we use the real proof algorithm to create the challenge ciphertext. In other words,
This lemma is proven in exactly the same way as Lemma 3.
Game 9 -Simulating decryption (part 3)
Lastly, we restore the decryption algorithm to its original state. Let Game 9 be identical to Game 8 except that the decryption algorithm now works properly:
This lemma is proven in exactly the same way as Lemma 2. However, Game 9 is identical to Expt
Combining all of the results of the lemmas give us that We use the following game hopping technique suggested by Dent [13] . Suppose Game i is such a game where A I wins with probability S i . Consider an event E that may occur during A I 's execution such that: -E is detectable by the simulator; -E is independent of S i ; -Game i and Game i + 1 are identical unless E occurs, in which case the game halts and outputs random bit.
Then we have Adv
In this game, A I is interacting with the actual attack environment. Namely, B generates the master key, the public parameters and the initial user's public keys and secret values following the specification of the scheme. We also assume that the environment B can answer decryption queries without knowing the matching secret values for changed public keys. In this real attack, let PPK = {ID 1 , . . . , ID q ppk } denote the inputs of partial private key queries and PK = {ID 1 , . . . , ID q pk } be the set of identities queried for private key extraction. Let also D = {w 1 , . . . , w q d } be the set of strings w j = H(C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ID j , pk j ) involved in decryption queries. Finally, let (ID , pk ID ) denote the target identity/public key pair involved in the challenge phase and let C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) be the returned challenge ciphertext and w = H(C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ID , pk ).
Game 2: Here, we change the generation of the master public key. The attack environment picks a, b
Let τ u and τ v be integers such that τ u (n + 1), τ v (n + 1) < p. We will define these values explicitly later on. The environment randomly selects (x u , x u,1 , . . . , x u,n )  and (x v , x v,1 , . . . , x v, 
has the correct distribution since J u (ID ) = J v (w ) = 0 mod p. We clearly have Adv 6 = Adv 5 .
In Games 7 and 8, we modify the treatment of private key, partial private key and decryption queries.
Game 7: We change Game 6 so that, after A I outputs her guess d , the environment B checks if one of the following events occurs:
• c mode = 0 and J u (ID i ) = 0 mod τ u for some ID i ∈ PPK with i ∈ {1, . . . , q ppk }.
• J u (ID j ) = 0 mod τ u for some ID j ∈ PK where j ∈ {1, . . . , q pk }.
Let E be the event that any of these conditions hold. It would be nice, at this point, if we could apply the Dent game hopping lemma. It is easy to see that E is recognisable, but we cannot be sure that E is independent of S 6 . It might be the case that there exists two sequences of oracle queries for which P r [E] is significantly different for each sequence and that A can choose to use one sequence in a manner that somehow depends upon the challenge message m d .
We avoid this problem by using the "re-normalisation" technique of Waters [31] . We derive a non-negligible lower bound for the probability that ¬E occurs for any set of oracle queries, estimate the probability that E occurs for the particular set of oracle queries that occurred during the execution of A, and add "artificial aborts" to make sure that A aborts with exactly the probability given by the lower bound.
We begin by deriving the theoretical lower bound. For simplicity, we only consider the case where c mode = 1. The case where c mode = 0 is similar. As we've mentioned, this is only a theoretical lower bound for the abort probability. We wish to arrange it so that the abort probability is exactly 1/4. To this end, we estimate the probability that the sequence of oracle queries that A has made will cause an abort by repeatedly picking values for x u , x u,j , x v and x v,j and testing to see whether these values will cause an abort for the sequence of oracle queries that A made. Note that this does not involve re-running the attacker A, but instead merely checking to see whether the simulator aborts with the set of oracle queries that A made during its first execution. Note also that we do not constrain the values of x u , x u,j , x v and x v,j to "fit" the public key value -we may assume that the y values are chosen so that the public key elements are as in the original execution of A. Let η be the probability that we do not have to abort for the given sequence of queries made by A, i.e. η = P r [¬E] . Let η be the probability estimate for η given by the repeated sampling of the x values. The Chernoff bound implies that for ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0 and O( −2 ln δ −1 ) samples, we have that P r[|η − η | ≥ ] ≤ δ. We have already shown that η ≥ 1/4. If A's execution did not abort, we force an artificial abort with probability (η − 1/4)/η (whenever η ≥ 1/4). In such a situation, the environment assumes that A output a random value d . The probability that an abort occurs is now given by: Hence, an abort does not occur with probability at least 1/4 − O( ) providing |η − η | ≤ (which itself occurs with probability 1 − δ). We first say that an error occurs if |η − η | > (which adds a constant δ term) and then apply Dent's game hopping lemma. We conclude that Adv 7 ≥ (Adv 6 − δ)(1/4 − O( )). For sufficiently small , we may conclude that Adv 7 ≥ (Adv 6 − δ)/8.
Game 8: We effectively change the treatment of A I 's queries. Let A = g a be a random element such that a is unknown to B. We first change the generation of the master public key. Depending on c mode , g 1 is generated in different ways.
• If c mode = 0, B sets g 1 = A (and does not know the master secret a).
• If c mode = 1, it sets g 1 = g γ for a randomly chosen γ $ ← Z * p which is kept for later use.
Queries: once started, A I issues queries whose treatment may depend on c mode .
-Request public key queries for an identity ID: -Replace public key queries for an input (ID, (X,Ỹ )): B ensures that (X,Ỹ ) has the correct shape and performs the replacement.
-Extract partial private key queries on an identity ID: 
computes w = H(C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ID , pk ID ). As previously, B aborts if J v (w ) = 0 mod p. Otherwise, it sets C 2 = (g c ) Ku(ID ) and C 3 = (g c ) Kv(w ) and returns (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ).
As long as J v (w) = 0 mod p, these changes do not affect the distribution of the challenge ciphertext and Adv 9 = Adv 8 . This completes the game hopping. We now combine the various inequalities arising in our game hopping steps. We have Combining the above, we finally obtain which completes the proof.
